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Aristotle held that ‘cause’ is said in many ways.1 Among the relations picked out by causal talk, 
in his view, are the relations between a substance and its material constituents, a substance and 
its form, a state and the process that brings that state about, and an activity and the final state 
brought about by that activity. These causes are introduced at Phys. 2.3 (194b16-5a3) as various 
answers to the questions why an event occurs or why a state is the way it is: one kind of answer 
is given by identifying that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists through the 
change, another by stating that for the sake of which an activity is undertaken, and so on. There 
now has been a long period where the conversation among metaphysicians over causation has 
centered on providing a single, generally applicable analysis. But recent years has seen renewed 
interest in causal pluralism, the view that there are several causal relations. Some causal 
pluralists follow Aristotle’s lead and view ‘cause’ as ambiguous. My aim in this paper is to 
disentangle these two positions. I will run through a prominent example to illustrate how and 
why the ambiguity claim is made (§1), argue that ‘cause’ is not ambiguous (§2) and float a few 
alternatives (§3). I will conclude with a sketch of a proposal: causal pluralism is better handled 
by treating ‘cause’ as a univocal term within a dynamic interpretation framework (§4). 
Before diving in, let me address a worry that referee #2 may already have. The paper 
concerns in part the thesis that there are several causal relations, but I simply will be assuming 
that this thesis is correct. Instead of questioning the pluralism, I will be asking how best to talk 
about a distinction among causal relations, whether the distinction requires us to say that ‘cause’ 
means different things in different contexts, and in particular whether such contextual variation is 
best cashed out as the view that ‘cause’ is ambiguous. The central issue of the paper then is a 
question of semantics: the meaning of ‘cause’ – both in our ordinary causal talk and in the 
                                                
1 See Phys. 195a4, 29, Meta. 983a26, 1013b4, 1052b48, De An. 415b9. My name-dropping here is 
not intended as scholarship. But we will return to Aristotle’s association of causal pluralism and 
questions. Readers interested in the scholarly issues around Aristotle’s application of homonymy 
to causation might begin with Stein (2011). 
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somewhat rarefied context of causal theorizing. Indeed, the paper might be viewed as in part a 
linguistic study of a dialect of English – that dialect which results from endorsing causal 
pluralism. As such, the paper may seem thin on philosophical content. So let me very briefly 
make two points so to indicate the philosophical interest of the issue, and I will return to this 
worry near the end of the paper. 
First, the paper plays defense. I said just now that some causal pluralists view ‘cause’ as 
ambiguous, but it would be better to say that a certain version of causal pluralism is typically 
associated, by both its proponents and its critics, with the ambiguity claim. Some of those who 
reject this version of causal pluralism mount an attack on the alleged ambiguity of ‘cause’, taking 
the attack to throw into question the associated version of causal pluralism. If causal pluralism 
can be disentangled from the claim that ‘cause’ is ambiguous, then causal pluralists have 
available a response to this line of criticism. And second, the issue of the paper is a case study in 
contextual variation in our causal talk. As we will see, the framework introduced to handle this 
case can be applied to a wide variety of causal discourse, and so the sketched proposal can itself 






It will be useful to introduce somewhat more precise characterizations. Call causal pluralism the 
view that there is not just one determinate causal relation.2 Causal pluralists might be divided 
into two broad classes: those who hold that there are a determinate number of clearly defined 
kinds of causation; and those who hold that causation is an indeterminate cluster concept: call 
these classes determinate and indeterminate causal pluralists, respectively. Now call the view 
that ‘cause’ is lexically ambiguous causal ambiguity theory. Determinate causal pluralism and 
causal ambiguity theory may seem to be natural allies. If you held that there are several 
determinate causal relations, it might be natural to view ‘cause’ as being ambiguous among these 
relations.  
                                                
2 Causal pluralists include Anscombe (1971), Skyrms (1984), Sober (1985), De Vreese (2006), 
Cartwright (2007), Godfrey-Smith (2010), Illari and Russo (2014), and McDonnell (2018). 
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Before turning to our example of a causal pluralist who is also a causal ambiguity 
theorist, I will make two observations. First, not all causal pluralists endorse causal ambiguity 
theory. For example, Cartwright (2007) holds that ‘cause’ picks out a single thin concept; it is 
other causative verbs, such as ‘compress’, ‘attract’ and ‘discourage’, that pick out distinct thick 
concepts. And many indeterminate causal pluralists view ‘cause’ as vague but not ambiguous 
among several clear meanings: see, for example, Godfrey-Smith (2010). Second observation: not 
all causal ambiguity theorists endorse causal pluralism. For example, Davidson is a causal 
ambiguity theorist who does not view ‘cause’ as ambiguous between kinds of causation. 
Davidson takes causation as an extensional relation holding among coarsely individuated events. 
But our causal judgements appear to be sensitive to finer grained distinctions among events. 
Davidson (1980, 161) considers examples such as the following: 
(1) The collapse was caused, not by the fact that the bolt gave way, but by the fact that it 
gave way so suddenly and unexpectedly. 
On Davidson’s view, the bolt giving away and the bolt giving away suddenly do not differ in 
causal role. Our judgements that (1) can be true challenges this view. Davidson (1980, 161-62) 
responds:  
What we must say in such cases is that in addition to, or in place of, giving what Mill 
calls the ‘producing cause’, such sentences tell, or suggest, a causal story. They are, in 
other words, rudimentary causal explanations. Explanations typically relate statements, 
not events. I suggest therefore that the ‘caused’ of the sample sentences … is not the 
‘caused’ of straightforward singular causal statements, but is best expressed by the words 
‘causally explains’. 
One might view Davidson’s move as positing an ambiguity between causation, an objective 
relation between coarse grained events, and causal explanation, a relation between finer grained 
representations. So although Davidson arguably views ‘cause’ as ambiguous, he does not thereby 
endorse causal pluralism. With these observations out of the way, now let us look at an example 
of a determinate causal pluralist who is also a causal ambiguity theorist.  
Hall (2004, 2006) argues that ‘cause’ is ambiguous between two objective causal 
relations. Here is a heavily streamlined version of Hall’s argument. Counterfactualist theories of 
causation endorse some variant of counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events as 
being sufficient for causation. Counterfactual dependence is usually tweaked in one way or 
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other, but not all of these complications need detain us. Let us just look at three features. 
Causation is transitive, as so-called early preemption cases bring out.  
ONE ROCK. Suzy and Billy each aim a rock at a window. Suzy throws her rock first, and it 
shatters the window. Seeing this, Billy does not throw his rock. But had Suzy not thrown 
her rock, Billy would have thrown his, and broken the window himself. Suzy’s throw 
causes the shattering.  
 
Intuitively, Suzy’s throwing her rock is a cause of the window shattering, but the shattering is not 
counterfactually dependent on Suzy’s throw. The shattering however is dependent on Sally’s 
rock sailing through the air towards the window, and Sally’s rock sailing through the air is 
dependent on Sally’s throwing the rock. We can handle these cases by allowing causation to be 
the ancestral of the counterfactual dependence relation.  
This tweak does not handle all cases, as late preemption cases bring out:  
TWO ROCKS. Suzy and Billy both throw a rock towards a window simultaneously. Sally 
throws a little harder than Billy and her rock reaches the window first, shattering it. 
Billy’s rock passes through the empty window frame a split second later. Suzy’s throw 
causes the shattering.  
 
Suzy’s throw causes the window to shatter, but of course had Suzy not thrown the rock, Billy’s 
throw ensures that the window would have shattered anyways. Looking for the ancestral of 
counterfactual dependence does not help. Every event that constitutes the trajectory of Sally’s 
rock is a cause of the shattering but the shattering depends on none of them. One response to 
such cases is to add a condition of spatiotemporal connectedness. Call this, after Hall (2004, 
225), locality: “causes are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally continuous sequences 
of causal intermediates.” Suzy’s throw is connected to the shattering, and so counts as a cause, 
Billy’s is not. Another response is to add a condition of intrinsicness: “[t]he causal structure of a 
process is determined by its intrinsic, noncausal character (together with the laws).” The process 
leading to the window shattering is determined by the intrinsic features of Suzy’s throw, her 
rock, the window, and so on, along with the physical laws – but the process is not determined by 
the intrinsic features of Billy’s throw, and his rock. This can be brought out by considering a 
world with perfect duplicates of Suzy’s throw, her rock and the window, but lacking Billy 
altogether: the window shatters in just the same way in this world as in the actual world.  
Call this relation exhibiting transitivity, locality and intrinsicness production. Production 
is arguably the intuitive notion of causation about which causal theorists are theorizing. But the 
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account of production fails to predict cases of causation involving omissions or double 
preventions. Consider Hall’s (2004, 241) case of double prevention: 
THE BOMBING. Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target, and 
Billy is piloting a fighter as her lone escort. Along comes an enemy fighter plane, piloted 
by Enemy. Sharp-eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s plane 
goes down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and the bombing takes place as 
planned. If Billy hadn’t pulled the trigger, Enemy would have eluded him and shot down 
Suzy, and the bombing would not have happened. Billy’s actions partly cause the 
bombing.  
 
Billy’s pulling the trigger prevents an event, Enemy’s shooting down Suzy, which would have 
prevented the bombing. Billy’s pulling the trigger is one of the causes of the bombing, but is 
spatiotemporally unconnected with the effect. A perfect duplicate of Suzy’s flight, but lacking 
both Billy and Enemy, would lead to the bombing. So double preventers are intuitively counted 
as causes, but fail to exhibit locality and intrinsicness. Or consider a case of causation by 
omission: 
THE PLANTS. I usually water my plants but I do not water my plants for a month, while 
binge watching T.V., and the plants die. My not watering the plants causes them to die.  
 
My not watering the plants causes their death. But if the omission is some kind of negative event, 
it does not seem to be spatiotemporally located at all, let alone connected to the plants’ death. Or 
suppose talk of my not watering my plants picks out some positive and causally efficacious event 
such as what I actually do instead of watering the plants – my binge watching T.V. Still, my 
binge watching T.V. is not spatiotemporally connected to the plants’ death. So some omissions 
are intuitively counted as causes, but are not productions.  
Hall’s response is to posit two concepts or kinds of causation. Under one conception – 
production –  transitivity, locality and intrinsicness are true but counterfactual dependence does 
not generally hold. Under the other conception, counterfactual dependence is causation. In this 
sense of causation, transitivity, locality and intrinsicness are not generally true. Call this 
dependence. Cases of late preemption exhibit production without dependence. Cases of 
intrinsicness and locality failure, such as omissions and double prevention, exhibit dependence 
without production. Hall views dependence and production as both causal notions. Dependence 
captures the notion that a cause is a difference maker for an effect. And the idea behind 
production is that a cause helps to bring about an effect. Furthermore, dependence and 
production can be both picked out by our causal terminology. An advantage for us in considering 
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this position is that Hall’s move is explicitly a claim of lexical ambiguity. For example, Hall 
(2004, 253), in reviewing the contrasting considerations in favour of the claim that 
counterfactual dependence is causation, on the one hand, and those supporting the claim that the 
counterfactual dependence is not causation, writes that “what is meant by ‘causation’ in each 
case is different.”3 
So Hall provides an example of a causal pluralist who is also a causal ambiguity theorist.4 
Critics also appear to view the ambiguity claim as entailed by determinate pluralism. For 
example, the indeterminate causal pluralist Godfrey-Smith (2010) argues that, if determinate 
causal pluralism were true, we would expect disambiguation requests similar to the clarification 
‘funny weird or funny ha-ha’, but switching between two senses is not viable in causal discourse 
– the situation is more disorderly. These specific criticisms might miss their target, as will 
become clearer shortly. But Godfrey-Smith brings out well that it is not just determinate causal 
pluralists who associate pluralism and causal ambiguity.  
Before moving on, let me address an objection. As we have seen, there is good evidence 
that at least some theorists associate causal pluralism and causal ambiguity theory. However, the 
ambiguity claim, even when explicitly made, often feels tossed off. So, the objection runs, causal 
pluralists are not especially invested in causal ambiguity theory. Were this correct, then the 
                                                
3 Hall’s specific version of determinate causal pluralism has received considerable attention. 
Some have embraced the distinction between production and dependence: see, for example, Illari 
and Russo (2014), and McDonnell (2018). Others have responded with unitary analyses of 
causation that nonetheless employ the distinction: for example, Beckers and Vennekens (2018) 
argue that dependence is an unnecessary but sufficient condition for causation, and production is 
an insufficient but necessary condition; and Andreas and Günther (2020) offer an analysis of 
causation by complementing production with a weak condition of difference-making. Hall’s 
pluralism has also received its share of criticism. Some criticize the sufficiency of production 
and dependence for causation: for example, Schaffer (2001, 2016) describes cases where an 
event causes an effect but neither does the cause produce the effect nor does the effect depend on 
the cause. Others criticize the necessity of the distinction: for example, Strevens (2013) argues 
that a single causal relation suffices to explain Hall’s double prevention cases. 
4 Other pluralists are less explicit. For example, Hitchcock (2001) associates causal pluralism 
with the rejection of the thesis that causation is univocal. This thesis could be seen as a 
conceptual position, and not a linguistic claim. But Hall and Hitchcock both confirm in personal 
correspondence that an ambiguity claim was their original intention. Other authors who contrast 
pluralism with an explicitly linguistic univocality thesis include De Vreese (2006 and 2009), 
Love (2012) and Schaffer (2016). Authors who contrast pluralism with a conceptual univocality 
thesis include Longworth (2006 and 2010) and Reiss (2009). 
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critical part of this paper might seem to lack interest. In response, note that some pluralists 
indeed might merely casually endorse the ambiguity claim – and of course the thesis of the paper 
is that a pluralist should not be an ambiguity theorist – but precision in expressing what linguistic 
claim is concomitant with pluralism is a virtue. 
Multiple interpretability can arise from a variety of phenomena, such as context 
sensitivity, vagueness or sense generality. But it is a difference of some philosophical 
significance which of these is the case for causal ascriptions. For example, were ‘cause’ vague, 
this would support indeterminate versions of causal pluralism but not determinate versions. Only 
were ‘cause’ general, would the various kinds of causation need to fall under a genus. And were 
‘cause’ an indexical, there would be a linguistic rule, known by competent speakers, that would 
determine in a context of use which kind of causation is picked out.  
The ambiguity claim is a natural correlate to determinate causal pluralism, in part because 
ambiguity is a common phenomenon of multiple interpretability, and one which lacks these 
consequences for pluralism: a pluralist who holds that ‘cause’ is ambiguous can endorse 
determinate pluralism (unlike the vague theorist), need not hold that there is a genus of causation 
(and, for example, there does not seem to be a genus with a differentia distinguishing the 
formally dissimilar notions of production and dependence), and need not saddle causal discourse 
with the machinery of indexicals.  






‘Cause’ fails tests for ambiguity. The view that ‘cause’ is ambiguous wrongly predicts zeugmatic 
conjunction reduction, and wrongly predicts the behaviour of ‘cause’ in ellipsis.5 Let us run 
through each kind of test in turn. Our first test relies on the observation that ambiguous terms 
allow the derivation of zeugmatic conjunction reductions. Consider the following. 
(2.1) The mood here is heavy. 
                                                
5 For these two tests, I’m drawing largely on Zwicky and Sadock (1975). For a recent survey of 
ambiguity from a philosophical perspective, see Sennet (2016). And for a recent use of such 
tests, see Shaheen (2017), who argues that ‘because’ is ambiguous between causation and 
grounding from alleged zeugmatic conjunction reduction.  
 8 
(2.2) The piano is heavy. 
#(2.3) The mood here and the piano are heavy.  
‘Heavy’ is used with different senses in (2.1) and (2.2), as the infelicity of (2.3) brings out. 
Zeugma typically has a somewhat humorous tone – of course, this is not to say that zeugma is all 
that funny, and the success of (2.3) as comedy falls a level somewhere around dad jokes. But 
regardless whether there is a humorous tone, such reductions do not allow cross readings: there’s 
no interpretation of ‘heavy’ in (2.3) that makes sense of the whole: if ‘heavy’ means foreboding, 
the piano is not heavy; and if ‘heavy’ means weighty, the mood is not heavy. The single 
occurrence of ‘heavy’ must do double duty in the reduced conjunction, a job it is incapable of 
performing. 
What of causation? We have been considering the view that ‘cause’ is ambiguous 
between dependence and production. This view predicts the derivation of zeugmatic conjunction 
reductions for mixed causal claims. But consider the following, said in the contexts of THE 
PLANTS and THE BOMBING, respectively.  
(3.1) My not watering the plants caused their death. 
(3.2) The unusually arid conditions caused the plant’s death. 
(3.3) My not watering the plants and the unusually arid conditions both caused the plants’ 
death. 
 
(4.1) The bomber’s actions caused the bombing. 
(4.2) The fighter’s actions caused the bombing.  
(4.3) The bomber’s and fighter’s actions both caused the bombing.  
(3.3) and (4.3) lack the awkwardness and humorous tone of (2.3). ‘Cause’, when allegedly 
ambiguous between production and dependence, fails the zeugmatic conjunction reduction test.  
A second test for ambiguity involves ellipsis failure. Consider 
(5) I saw Larry’s duck under the table, and I saw Darryl’s too. 
By uttering (5) I could be saying that I saw two waterfowl or two evasive actions, but I could not 
be saying that I saw one of each, except in another lame attempt at comedy. As in conjunction 
reductions, the single remaining occurrence of the elided term must provide a sense for both 
clauses. Ambiguous terms can not always do this job. What of causation? The distinction 
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between production and dependence does not yield infelicitous ellipsis. Consider the following, 
said in the context of THE BOMBING:  
 (6) The bomber caused the bombing, and the fighter did too. 
(6) is felicitous, even when I mean that the bomber’s actions produced the bombing and the 
bombing is dependent on the fighter’s actions. The reader can easily confirm that similar 
comments could be made about omission cases. So the hypothesis that ‘cause’ is ambiguous 
between production and dependence fails to predict correctly linguistic judgements involving 
ellipsis.  
Let us sum up. The view that ‘cause’ is lexically ambiguous wrongly predicts zeugmatic 
conjunction reductions, and wrongly predicts ellipsis failure. If this is right, then ‘cause’ is not 
ambiguous. Before moving on, I will address two objections. First, we have looked at empirical 
evidence to argue against causal ambiguity theory, and our opponent might respond that tracking 
ordinary linguistic judgements is just one virtue among many: to fail tests for ambiguity is to 
incur a cost, but it is a cost outweighed by the philosophical benefits of causal ambiguity theory. 
This objection misconstrues the dialectic. Causal ambiguity theory is put forward as a linguistic 
claim about our ordinary causal discourse. Correctly predicting linguistic judgements is not one 
virtue among many. One might shift to a revisionist stance, and concede that our pre-
philosophical causal talk is not ambiguous, yet hold that we ought to treat ‘cause’ as ambiguous, 
since to do so yields philosophical rewards. But to view ambiguity theory as prescriptive and not 
descriptive would be to undercut the strategy of using the ambiguity claim so to handle 
countervailing linguistic judgements. Hall wants to show that our reactions to cases such as THE 
PLANTS and THE BOMBING, counting omissions and double preventers as causes, does not require 
revision of an account of production. A revisionist stance would not allow these moves.  
Second objection. With (2.3) and (5), I have chosen cases that contrast strikingly with 
causal examples such as (3.3), (4.3) and (6). But we should distinguish two kinds of ambiguity. 
Homonymous terms, such as heavy or bank, have unrelated senses. Some homonyms, such as 
heavy, have senses that are etymologically connected: ‘heavy’ took on the sense of foreboding 
by meataphorical extension of its sense as weighty. For others, such as bank, it is just an accident 
that the same syntactic string of letters have the different senses. But for any homonym, there is 
no shared meaning component that relates the current meanings of the term. By contrast, there 
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are other examples of ambiguity where the term has distinct but related senses. A classic 
example is healthy: a diet is healthy since it promotes health; but a complexion is healthy since it 
indicates health. The various senses of healthy share, as a component of their distinct senses, the 
sense of health. Call a term having multiple related senses polysemy. ‘Healthy’ is a polysemous 
term in this sense. Now consider a conjunction reduction with polysemy. 
(7.1) His diet is healthy. 
(7.2) His complexion is healthy. 
?(7.3) His diet and complexion are healthy. 
 
Readers might find (7.3) felicitous. (7.3) lacks a humorous tone, and we do talk this way on 
occasion. But just as in the case of ‘heavy’ in (2.3), there is no cross reading that can interpret 
‘healthy’ in (7.3). Polysemous terms share a meaning component. But there isn’t a single 
complete meaning common to all occurrences that would allow a plausible reading of (7.3). One 
might suggest, as a candidate single meaning, something along the lines of  ‘pertains in some 
way or other to health’. It would be unusual circumstances where one would utter (7.3) to make 
the vague observation that his diet and complexion both pertain in some way or other to health. If 
one were to utter (7.3), they likely would be misspeaking or speaking loosely, and intending to 
get across what the following says: 
(7.4) His diet is healthy and his complexion is healthy. 
The unreduced conjunction (7.4) means that his diet promotes health and his complexion 
indicates health. The slip from an unreduced conjunction to a reduced conjunction is a natural 
one. But to observe this is not to say that (7.3) means what (7.4) means. At any rate, if such a 
reading is available, then ‘healthy’ is neither ambiguous nor polysemous. 
Polysemy is the kind of ambiguity presumably intended by those who claim that ‘cause’ 
is ambiguous. Dependence and production are not unrelated or merely etymologically related 
pairs of senses of ‘cause’. And just as the feeling of zeugma is attenuated in (7.3), in comparison 
to (2.3), so too (the objection continues), the weak zeugma of (3.3) and (4.3) does not show that 
‘cause’ is not polysemous.  
To report my own linguistic judgement, I hear (7.3) as zeugmatic, and (3.3) and (4.3) as 
not. But readers might not share this judgement. And I take the conjunction reduction and ellipsis 
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tests as providing initial evidence, and not conclusive proof, of ambiguity.6 The right response to 
the objection is to provide a univocal interpretation of ‘cause’. To do so will support my 
judgement that there is a single meaning that can interpret both conjuncts in each of (3.3) and 
(4.3), and can provide a referent for the ellided term in (7). And to do so will allow us to 
conclude that one who endorses the distinction between production and dependence need not 





What options are there, other than viewing ‘cause’ as ambiguous? I will next consider four 
options: viewing ‘cause’ as a general term, viewing ‘cause’ as an indexical; taking one of the 
causal relations as conveyed through implicature; and taking one of the causal relations as 
presupposed. 
The reader might wonder why I am considering these other options. The following survey 
of alternative semantic views available to the pluralist, while not exhaustive, lends some support 
to selling the interest of the issue of the paper (since it is not obvious what the pluralist should 
say about the meaning of ‘cause’), lends some support to the positive proposal sketched in the 
next section (since, although the survey can not be proven to be exhaustive, the proposal is at 
least the last one standing), and addresses actual suggestions and objections made in 
conversation. Finally, recall that multiple interpretability can be due to a variety of phenomena. 
Viewing ‘cause’ as ambiguous might be the most natural semantic correlate to determinate 
causal pluralism. But it will yield philosophical fruit to consider these other options.  
It might seem promising to view ‘cause’ as a general term. On this view, causation is a 
genus, and kinds of causation, such as production and dependence, are its species. Notice that, 
like causal statements, general terms do not generate zeugmatic conjunction reductions. Consider 
the following, said of a cat and a dog.  
(8.1) Kitty is an animal. 
(8.2) Rex is an animal. 
(8.3) Kitty and Rex are both animals. 
                                                
6 For critical discussion of these tests, see Norrick (1981) and Geeraerts (1993).  
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General terms also exhibit behaviour similar to causal statements with respect to ellision. 
General terms, unlike ambiguous terms, allow the ellision to pick up on the a different species 
from the elided species. For example, consider again  
(5) I saw Larry’s duck under the table, and I saw Darryl’s too. 
I could utter (5) if I saw Larry’s mallard and Darryl’s common eider.  
Ambiguous terms are associated with a disjunction of meanings. ‘Bank’ may mean a 
financial institution or it may mean a river bed. And ‘cause’ arguably exhibits a similar 
association. ‘Cause’ sometimes picks out the relation of production, and exhibits transitivity, 
locality and intrinsicness; and ‘cause’ sometimes picks out the relation of dependence, and may 
exhibit none of these features. However, association with disjunctions is not unique to ambiguity. 
Ambiguous and general terms can be difficult to discern, since both may be associated with 
disjunctions. ‘Bank’ may mean a financial institution or it may mean a river bed. ‘Animal’ might 
be associated with a cat or a dog, and so on for the other species of animals. Many of the tests for 
ambiguity, at which we have been looking, were originally designed to distinguish ambiguity 
and generality. 
Roberts (1984, 1987) noted that although both general terms and ambiguous terms can be 
associated with disjunctions, the scope differs. General terms can have a single disjunctive 
meaning; ambiguous terms, by contrast, are associated with a disjunction of meanings. This 
suggests a test for ambiguity. For discussion of Robert’s (1984) test, see Zwicky and Sadock 
(1987), and for a response, Roberts (1987). If there is a context in which a term has the meaning 
φ, and in another context ψ, then the term may be ambiguous. But if the term can be read as 
having the disjunctive meaning (φ or ψ) in both contexts, it may be instead an unambiguous 
general term.  
One way to bring out this contrast between disjunctive meaning and a disjunction of 
meanings is to consider certain questions. For example, McCawley (1981, 9) considers:  
(9) Is John a bastard?  
We might be asking if John is a nasty man. Or we might be asking if he is illegitimate. If 
‘bastard’ meant nasty man or illegitimate, then the answer would be yes provided he was at least 
one. But if John is nasty and legitimate, or pleasant and illegitimate, the answer may well be no, 
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in the right context. That is to say, we are either asking whether John is nasty, and his legitimacy 
is irrelevant, or we are asking whether John is illegitimate, and his pleasantness is irrelevant. By 
contrast, consider 
(10) Is Kitty an animal? 
Here the answer is yes provided Kitty is a cat or a dog or some other species of animal.   
Does ‘cause’ pass tests for general terms? The picture here is complicated. Consider a 
question test, applied in the situation of THE MISSION:   
(11) Did the fighter cause the bombing? 
If ‘cause’ were ambiguous, an indexical or otherwise context dependent, we might expect (11) to 
be true in contexts of utterance where (11) is asking if the bombing depends on the fighter’s 
actions, and false in contexts where (11) is asking if the fighter produces the bombing. But if 
‘cause’ is a general term, we would expect the same answer regardless whether the bombing 
depends on the fighter’s actions or (counterfactually in THE BOMBING) the fighter’s actions 
produce the bombing. Readers might hear (11) in this way, and so true regardless of the kind of 
influence the fighter has on the bombing. But personally I do not find this judgement to be 
robust. We can bring this out with the following dialogue. 
(12) A: Did the fighter cause the bombing? 
B: Yes. 
A: I meant, did the fighter pull the switch releasing the bombs? 
The felicity of (12) suggests that there may be contexts of utterance where (11), applied in the 
situation of THE BOMBING, can be answered negatively.7 By contrast, general terms do not allow 
for such continuations.  
#(13) A:Is Spot an animal?  
B: Yes. 
A: I meant, is he a cat? 
                                                
7 Recall that Godfrey-Smith (2010) argues that, since we do not find disambiguation requests, 
‘cause’ is not ambiguous. Dialogues such as (12) suggest that at least sometimes such 
clarifications can be made. 
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(13) might be said as a correction, with A’s second utterance indicating that they should not have 
said ‘animal’ before. But such situations are unlike contexts where the question, ‘Is Spot an 
animal?’ should be answered negatively, provided Spot is a cat.  
Even if ‘cause’ is neither ambiguous nor a general term, those who agree with Hall in 
drawing a distinction between production and dependence might find it attractive to view ‘cause’ 
as shifting its meaning from one context of use to another. A natural suggestion would be to view 
‘cause’ as an indexical. Variation of meaning from one context of use to another is 
paradigmatically handled through indexicals, and an indexical proposal is common in other 
areas; for example, many epistemic contextualists view ‘knows’ as an indexical. But indexicals 
and demonstratives exhibit zeugmatic conjunction reduction. Consider the following. 
(14.1) Fred went there. 
(14.2) George went there.  
#(14.3) Fred and George both went there. 
Suppose that I utter (14.1) pointing south, and (14.2) pointing north; then (14.3) lacks a felicitous 
reading. 
Might we instead view ‘cause’ as univocal but with a variety of uses? Such an approach 
would place our causal distinctions – between production and dependence, or between causation 
and explanation – into the pragmatics of causal discourse. Pragmatic strategies come in one of 
two flavours. One might view the act of making an utterance as adding information not narrowly 
said by that utterance. On this approach, causal claims assert just one causal concept, but can 
convey information about other causal concepts. So for example, we might try to retain Hall’s 
distinction by holding that causal statements assert what produces what, and not what depends on 
what. Then, strictly, (3.1) and (4.1) all say something false. These statements, recall are: 
(3.1) My not watering the plants caused them to die. 
(4.1) The bomber’s actions caused the bombing. 
My not watering the plants does not cause the plants to die, since my inaction does not produce 
the death, but (3.1) can convey that the death depends on my inaction. And similarly for (4.1). 
On this approach, the information conveyed is something added on by the action and context of 
utterance, after a proposition expressed by the utterance itself has already been determined. So 
call this post-propositional pragmatics.  
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I will turn to the second kind of pragmatic approach in the next section. But l will first 
raise two objections to post-propositional pragmatic approaches. First, these pragmatists 
implausibly must ascribe pervasive semantic blindness to ordinary speakers. Suppose that our 
causal talk picks out production, but we can use such talk to convey information about the 
relevant dependence relations. And suppose again that I did not water my plants, as I usually do, 
and they die. I say (3.1). Most of us, outside of philosophy discussions, would view (3.1) as true. 
The pragmatist strategy is to view all such claims as false, since my not watering the plants did 
not produce the plants’ death. So pragmatists must view most of us as mistaken about the truth 
value of many of our causal statements. Of course, speakers are capable of misconstruing 
felicitous but false utterances for truths. And we should not view empirical evidence from 
ordinary speaker’s usage as sacrosanct. But care ought to be taken when rejecting such evidence. 
Such care is needed generally in philosophy and especially in this context. Much of the 
argumentative methodology in the causation literature hangs on linguistic judgements. If we 
reject too much ordinary linguistic behaviour, we risk undercutting our own methodology.  
A second objection. The post-propositional pragmatist holds that when I utter (3.1) I 
unawares say something false but I deliver true information about the dependence of the plant’s 
death on my not watering them. But there is no known mechanism that can carry this information 
for the post-propositional pragmatist. Let me look briefly at the two main mechanisms for 
pragmatic delivery of information. The first is conversational implicature. To repeat a well-worn 
example, suppose I say of a job candidate 
(15) They have excellent handwriting. 
I convey that I believe that they are a poor candidate, without saying that they are so. 
Conversational implications are typically cancellable: an implicature that p is explicitly 
cancellable if it is permissible to add ‘but not p’. (15) can be cancelled, for example by: 
(15.1) They have excellent handwriting, but I do not mean to suggest that they are a poor 
candidate. On the contrary, they both have excellent handwriting and are a good 
candidate. 
It would be unusual in a hiring meeting to say (15.1) but it is not infelicitous. Any analogous 
attempted cancellation for my utterance about my plants, however, is worse than infelicitous.  
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# (15.2) My not watering the plants caused them to die, but I do not mean to suggest that 
the plants’ death depended on my not watering the plants. On the contrary, my not 
watering the plants produced their death. 
#(15.3) The fighter’s actions in THE BOMBING partly caused the bombing. But I do not 
mean to suggest that the bombing merely depended on the fighter’s actions.  
Cancellation tests are defeasible evidence. But cancellation tests typically fail for reasons that 
offer little comfort for the pragmatist. For example, propositions that are both implicated and 
entailed can not be cancelled. But if a dependence relation is entailed by the omission statement, 
then it is arguably part of what is said, and not, as the pragmatist would have it, conveyed but not 
part of the content. To give another example, we might expect awkward cancellation when 
speakers conflate what is said and what it conveys. The pragmatist views her opponent as 
making this very conflation. But (15.2) is not merely awkward; it undermines the very distinction 
between production and dependence the pragmatist wishes to make.  
A second pragmatic mechanism for the delivery of information is presupposition. When I 
say  
(16) The knave stole the tarts  
I presuppose the information that there is a knave. One test for presupposition is that a sentence 
and its negation share presuppositions:  
(16.1) The knave did not steal the tarts 
also presupposes that there is a knave. The omission statement (3.1) does presuppose the lack of 
a certain watering event. This presupposition can be brought out by a negation test. Consider:  
(16.3) My not watering the plants did not cause the plants to die. 
(3.1) and (16.3) presuppose the same lack of a watering event. However, (3.1) does not merely 
presuppose this lack. It, unlike (16.3), asserts that this lack is salient to identifying the cause of 
the plants’ death. It is this information with which the eliminativist would replace omission talk. 
Similar comments could be made about negations of double prevention claims. 
The information about dependence that I get across when I say that my not watering the 
plants caused them to die is neither conveyed through implicature nor presupposed. So, if such 
information is delivered pragmatically, it is by a less well studied mechanism. But the problem is 
not merely that pragmatists owe us a detailed account of the pragmatics. No mechanism could do 
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the job needed by the post-propositional pragmatist. Shuffling the information from what is said 
to what is conveyed or presupposed gets the means by which these causal statements deliver 
information wrong. When I say ‘My not watering the plants caused them to die’, we might agree 
that there is information about the dependence of the plants’ death on my inactivity that I get 





We have set out several desiderata. A theory of causal discourse should correctly predict 
behaviour in tests for ambiguity such as zeugmatic conjunction elimination and ellipsis; in tests 
for general terms such as the question test; in tests for implicature such as the cancellation test; 
and in tests for presupposition such as the negation test. And we should hesitate to ascribe 
semantic blindness to ordinary speakers. Viewing ‘cause’ as ambiguous, a general term, an 
indexical or as conveying additional information through implicature or presupposition all fail to 
meet these desiderata.  
In the previous section, I noted that there are two kinds of pragmatic approach. The first 
kind we labelled post-propositional since the context of utterance contributes information only 
after the proposition said has been determined. Let us turn to the second kind. In pre-
propositional pragmatics, the act and context of an utterance contributes to determining what 
proposition is expressed. I will sketch a pre-propositional pragmatics, and indicate how the 
theory could be applied so to retain the distinction which Hall introduces between production and 
dependence. My goals here are modest. The presentation will be informal. I will lay out one 
version of a pre-propositional pragmatics, a dynamic theory, so that the discussion will have 
specificity. But I will not defend the details of the sketch, since my aim is to illustrate a general 
approach, and not defend any specific version of a pre-propositional pragmatics. 
Dynamic theories draw on Stalnaker’s (1974, 1978, 1999) work on assertion and 
presupposition, and were developed by the linguists Partee (1978), Heim (1982, 1992), 
Groenendikjk and Stokhof (1989), Kamp and Reyle (1993), Roberts (1996) and others. These 
theories range from approaches more proximate to Stalnaker’s work to approaches more distal, 
as I will discuss momentarily. But the leading idea behind all of these theories is that 
communication takes place within a context of information that shifts as the discourse continues, 
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and new utterances update this background. In Stalnaker’s approach, any moment of a 
conversation has a common ground of the interlocutor’s shared beliefs at that time – those 
propositions implicitly recognized by each interlocutor as shared. Associated with the common 
ground is a context set of the possible worlds that, for all we know, might be the actual world. 
The goal of an assertion is to reduce the context set, discarding worlds from the live options. If 
we could continue our conversation indefinitely, we would distill the context set down to a 
singleton, identifying the actual world. Stalnaker cashes out this idea by introducing a pragmatic 
rule of assertion: one utters a sentence expressing a certain proposition to add this new 
information to the context set, thereby altering the information constituting the common ground. 
Since propositions can be modelled as sets of worlds, assertion is treated as intersecting the 
asserted proposition with the prior context set to produce an updated conversation state. The 
asserted sentence is thus associated with a function from contexts of possible utterance to 
updated contexts, what Heim (1984) calls its context change potential.  
A model for discourse requires that more structure be added to this framework. Different 
dynamic theories take different approaches; for example, discourse reference theory adds a set of 
discourse referents, the objects under discussion, which allows for such features as anaphora and 
deixis. But for most dynamic theories, the context set far outstrips the salient possibilities: not all 
worlds in the context set are equally relevant to the interlocutor’s goals and intentions at a given 
moment of a conversation. If we leave these sets unordered, we fail to track what worlds and 
objects are salient to the discussion. One way to impose more structure is to view communication 
as governed by a question under discussion. For a theory developed along these lines, see for 
example Roberts (1996).  
Questions might be thought of semantically as partitions on the space of worlds. A 
primary goal of communication is to determine, for the question under discussion, in which cell 
the actual world lies. A strategy for answering this question is to raise subquestions entailed by 
the question under discussion. Following Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), let’s say that one 
question (the superquestion) entails a second (the subquestion) just in case any answer to the first 
answers the second. A conversation proceeds by breaking up the question under discussion into 
subquestions that are entailed by that question, and which might be easier to answer. To 
illustrate, here is an example similar to one given by Roberts (2004).  
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(17) A1: How do I get to Santa Monica? 
B1: You can take the 2.  
A2: Where do I catch that? 
B2: It stops on Hilgard. 
A1 introduces the question under discussion. B2 partly answers this question and might be 
viewed as introducing the 2 bus into the set of discourse referents. A2 draws on the salience of 
this object to provide a referent for the demonstrative. This second question is entailed by the 
question under discussion, and so B2 contributes to providing a fuller answer to this 
superquestion. In (17) the questions are explicit but the questions under discussion and their 
subquestions are often implicit.  
Now let us apply this framework to causal discourse. For specificity, I will assume a 
Hall-style pluralism, with distinct causal notions of production and dependence. This choice of 
underlying pluralist theory is being made to give the proposal specificity. But the proposal is 
neutral with respect to which pluralism is true, and I will return to the assumption of a Hall-style 
pluralism after laying out the proposal. We might view the question under discussion for causal 
discourse as ‘How did the target event come about?’ But this question under discussion can 
entail a variety of subquestions. One such question might take the form ‘What is the process by 
which the target event come about?’ An exhaustive answer to that question would include the 
event’s complete production history. This history contains every event linked by production 
relations leading to the target event. A real world discourse would not provide a complete 
answer, of course: for example, good representatives of the production path often suffice, and 
proximate links in the production history are typically more salient. 
Another subquestion might take the form ‘What difference-makers are there for the 
process by which that event came about?’ Such questions can have as answers events which do 
not produce the effect but on which the effect depends. An exhaustive answer to this question 
might include all such events. These difference-makers to the process would include 
innumerably many omissions, and might include double preventors. And again a real world 
discourse would be highly selective as to what answers are appropriate.  
Answers to subquestions contribute to answering their superquestion, and for their 
expression can inherit locutions appropriate to that superquestion. Since the superquestion ‘How 
did the target event come about?’ entails both of the subquestions ‘What is the process by which 
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the target event come about?’ and ‘What difference-makers are there for the process by which 
that event came about?’, it is not surprising that answers to these subquestions make use of 
causal locutions. We talk of my not watering the plants as causing their death because, insofar as 
they answer the second subquestion, they are part of a strategy to answer the question under 
discussion in causal discourse. The proposal is that interlocutors can introduce these different 
subquestions under a superquestion that governs the overall goal of causal discourse, and this 
explains the use of causal locutions to characterize both production and dependence.  
On this view, ‘cause’ is univocal. The meaning of ‘cause’ is a function from possible 
contexts of utterances to updated contexts, governed by the superquestion ‘How did the target 
event come about?’ That question entails different subquestions – one where it is appropriate to 
identify a producer, and one where it is appropriate to identify an event on which the effect 
depends but which does not produce the effect. English does not use distinct terminology to 
distinguish answers to these subquestions. This is why we speak of omissions and double 
preventors as causes. In effect, through coining talk of ‘dependence’ and ‘production’, Hall has 
introduced the terminology to distinguish answers to the subquestions into a dialect of English, 
that fragment of the language used by metaphysicians. 
Here is evidence in support of the proposal – the dynamic interpretation approach meets 
our desiderata. First, the proposal explains the behaviour of causal statements in ambiguity and 
ellipsis tests. For example, we can explain why conjunction eliminations are not zeugmatic. 
Consider again  
(4.1) The bomber’s actions caused the bombing. 
(4.2) The fighter’s actions caused the bombing.  
(4.3) The bomber’s and fighter’s actions both caused the bombing.  
(4.1) and (4.2) both contribute to answering the same superquestion, albeit through answering 
different subquestions. And so (4.3) is felicitous. (Recall from §2 that the assessment of the 
felicity of (4.3) is made with THE BOMBING as the backstory.) There is a meaning to the reduced 
term, ‘caused’, that can do double duty for both conjuncts. Similar comments can be made about 
the ellipsis test. Consider again 
 (6) The bomber caused the bombing, and the fighter did too. 
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(6) is felicitous. Although the action of the fighter produces the bombing and the bombing 
merely depends on the action of the fighter, the superquestion structures the set of discourse 
referents so that both actions are salient.  
Second, unlike with post-propositional pragmatic theories, claims such as (3.1), ‘My not 
watering the plants caused their death’, are not read as false and we do not need to ascribe 
semantic blindness to ordinary speakers. The proposal explains the behaviour of causal 
statements in tests for implicature and presupposition. The dependence of the plants’ death on 
my inaction is a part of what is said by (3.1), and so cannot be cancelled, and is not presupposed 
by both the claim and its negation. 
Finally, the proposal explains the somewhat complicated behaviour of causal claims in 
the question test for general terms. Recall, I suggested that readers might find 
(11) Did the fighter cause the bombing? 
to be answered affirmatively regardless of context, a mark of general terms. But, recall, the 
proposal that ‘cause’ is a general term wrongly predicts that the dialogue  
 
(12) A: Did the fighter cause the bombing? 
B: Yes. 
A: I meant, did the fighter pull the switch releasing the bombs? 
 
is infelicitous, since analogous dialogues with uncontroversial general terms are indeed 
infelicitous (Remember, we compared (12) with: A: Is that (pointing at a dog) an animal? B: 
Yes. A: I meant, is it a cat?). It is a point in favour of the dynamic interpretation that it predicts 
the felicity of (12) since the reading allows for there to be two uses of A’s first utterance in (12), 
one looking for information about production, and another looking for information about 
dependence. So in contexts governed only by the question under discussion, (11) is answered 
affirmatively provided the fighter either produces the bombing or the bombing depends on the 
fighter’s actions. In contexts governed by the subquestion ‘What is the process by which the 
target event come about?, (11) can be answered negatively since the bombing merely depends on 
the fighter’s actions. The dialogue in (12) introduces just such a context.  
There are other advantages to the proposal. Recall that multiple interpretability can arise 
from a variety of mechanisms. The dynamic interpretation avoids the constraints placed on 
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pluralism by these alternatives. Unlike the view that causal pluralism is expressed by sense 
generality, the dynamic interpretation theorist need not hold that there is some genus under 
which the various kinds of causation fall. The great variety of ways in which a super question 
might be answered by answering a subquestion allows for greater flexibility than the species-
genus relation. Unlike the view that ‘cause’ is an indexical, the dynamic theorist need not ascribe 
to speakers knowledge of a straightforward rule that determines which causal relation is 
appropriate in a given context. There are of course contextual indicators that influence what 
causal subquestion is appropriate, arising from the progress of the discourse, and the shared 
beliefs and intentions of the interlocutors. But such contextual determination is more subtle than 
any rule that maps an indexical expression onto a content.  
So much for the sketch of a dynamic theory and its application to causal discourse. Now, 
a few disclaimers. The proposal is neutral in two respects. First, the proposal is neutral with 
respect to a specific semantic framework. For specificity, I have sketched a broadly Stalnakerian 
approach. Such an approach uses a traditional, static semantics: a sentence expresses a truth 
condition which, relative to a context, determines a proposition, modelled as a set of worlds. 
Supplementing this semantics, as we have seen, is a pragmatic rule: one utters a sentence, 
expressing the proposition p, with the typical intention of changing the conversation state by 
adding the information that p to that state. Since conversation states are also modelled as sets of 
worlds, an assertion can be seen as a proposal to intersect the asserted proposition p with the 
initial conversation state. Such manoeuvres can be thought of as governed by implicit questions, 
since questions might be viewed as partitions on a space of possible worlds. Making an assertion, 
and so answering a question, reduces the conversation state to one cell. Updating the common 
ground can only eliminate possibilities. There is no going back. This limits the dynamicism of 
the approach; indeed, some linguists view such eliminativeness as a mark of a static conversation 
system. See for example, Rothschild and Yalcin (2015).  
But there have been proposed a wide variety of dynamic semantics: Kamp’s (1981) 
discourse representation theory, Heim’s (1983) file change semantics, Groenendijk and 
Stokhof’s (1991) dynamic predicate logic, and many others. Although a static semantics is 
compatible with viewing a conversation dynamically in terms of context change potential, 
dynamic semantics identifies the semantic content of a sentence with that context change 
potential, not a truth condition. Such systems are typically noneliminative. For example, in 
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dynamic predicate logic an indefinite can reset the set of discourse referents without regard for 
previous membership.  
The choice of a Stalnakerian approach offers several advantages. One advantage is that 
the presentation is, I hope, broadly accessible. Partly for this reason, I have kept the presentation 
nontechnical, and I have presented a mere sketch of the mechanics. Another advantage is that the 
presentation is conservative. More outré approaches to dynamicness are controversial.8 Although 
many linguists argue that we need more robustly dynamic theories, the Stalnakerian approach 
offers a minimally dynamic approach, the rough lines of which is something on which we can all 
agree. And a final advantage is that our discussion remains ecumenical. The observation that 
causal pluralism can be handled by incorporating dynamic elements is plausibly neutral on what 
specific dynamic theory we should endorse – or, more cautiously, a variety of approaches are 
live options, and it is not my current purpose to decide among these options. The goal of this 
paper has been to argue that causal pluralism and causal ambiguity theory should be 
disentangled; I hope to have persuaded you of this, regardless of your semantic proclivities. 
Secondly, the proposal is neutral with respect to the questions under discussion. For 
specificity, I have sketched a broadly Hall-style pluralism, with questions corresponding to what 
produces the effect and to that on which the effect depends. But the questions used for the sketch 
are little more than placeholders. Other pluralists will choose other kinds of questions, and the 
specific interpretation of the super- and subquestions will reflect internal debates among 
pluralists. But, as in the case of the choice of dynamic theory, so too for the choice of pluralism, 
it is an advantage to remain ecumenical. This paper has aimed to show that pluralism and causal 
ambiguity theory should be disentangled: pluralists should not be causal ambiguity theorists; this 
is true regardless of what stripe of pluralism you advocate. 
That is not to say that the characterization of the questions will be straightforward. Notice 
that there is no difficulty in stipulating a superquestion that can be answered by different causal 
relations. The question is just a partition of the context set. And a characterization of the question 
is easy: a disjunctive question ranging over the plurality of kinds of causes succeeds. For 
                                                
8 For discussion of this controversy, see for example Lewis (2017). The application of one 
approach or another to a specific issue of philosophical interest also generates controversy. See 
for example, Gillies (2007) and Moss (2012) on handling reverse Sobel sequences with either a 
dyamic semantics or dynamic pragmatics, and the implications for counterfactuals. 
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example, for a pluralist who holds that either a cause produces an effect or an effect depends on 
its cause, the disjunctive question, ‘what produces the effect or on what does the effect depend?’ 
successfully characterizes the appropriate superquestion. The difficulty is to motivate a 
nondisjunctive characterization of the question that can be answered by any of the range of kinds 
of causes, and which could be grasped by competent language users. I do not know how to do 
this. And I leave it as an unsolved problem for pluralists. 
Before bringing the paper to a conclusion, let me say a few words in order to locate the 
proposal relative to the current literature on polysemy. Traditionally, polysemy – recall, a lexical 
item having multiple related senses – has been treated as a kind of ambiguity, and this approach 
continues to have its advocates: for a few recent examples, see Lepore and Stone (2015), Brocher 
et al. (2016, 2018), and Devitt (2013, 2020, 2021). On this line, polysemous terms have distinct 
conventionally encoded lexical meanings, stored mentally and retrieved individually from that 
store on an occasion of use. The approach allows polysemy to be handled with a contextually 
invariant compositional semantics – that is to say, with the same theoretic resources used for 
monosemous terms. But the line faces certain challenges. It conflates polysemy and homonymy, 
since both terms with related senses and terms with unrelated senses are treated as ambiguous. It 
requires profligate stored senses, since each interpretation of a polysemous term requires a 
distinct conventionally encoded lexical meaning; as such, the approach appears vulnerable to the 
charge of being ideologically inflationary. And it cannot easily account for novel usage; for 
example, Devitt (2021) concedes that a semantic approach must be supplemented with a 
pragmatic process to explain use of a term when there is no conventionalized meaning but a 
speaker introduces an ad hoc sense through an original metaphor, metonymy, or some such 
trope.  
In recent years, pragmatic approaches have received considerable attention. Such 
approaches tend to take a polysemous term as having a single lexical meaning. The contribution 
the term makes to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed in a given occasion of use is 
derived inferentially from this directly retrieved lexical meaning. For example, one might view 
the term’s literal meaning as modulated in a context through such phenomena as metonymy 
(‘school’ as institution, building or personnel), sense extension or loosening (‘swallow’ applied 
to living agents with digestive systems or to ATM’s), enrichment or narrowing (‘drink’ applied 
to drink generally or to alcoholic drink), and metaphor (‘chicken’ applied to the animal or a 
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coward). Modulation exhibits a great variety of dimensions, including container/contents (‘He 
drank the whole bottle’), object/information (‘book’), place/event (‘Woodstock’), 
creator/creation (‘I’ve read Dickens’), and many more. Recent discussion of broadly pragmatic 
approaches can be found in Ruhl (1989), Frison and Pickering (2001), Recanati (2004, 2010, 
2017), Wilson and Carston (2007), and Falkum (2015, 2017), to name a few. For a current 
survey, interested readers might look to Carston (2020). 
Within broadly pragmatic approaches, there are a variety of choice points. Theorists 
differ on the nature of the pragmatic process. Earlier, we distinguished pre- and post-
propositional pragmatic processes. One might view the pragmatic process for polysemy as pre-
propositional: on this approach, the lexical meaning of a polysemous term is the input to 
modulation; the content contributed to truth conditions of utterances containing that term is its 
output. In this way, the process determines what is said or the truth-conditional content. To give 
just one example, Recanati (2004, 2010, 2017) takes this approach. Alternatively, one might 
view the process as a post-propositional pragmatic process, taking what is said as input and 
yielding additional information conveyed as output. For example, Falkum’s (2015) relevance-
theoretic approach might be viewed as employing a post-propositional pragmatic process.  
A different choice point is the nature of the lexical meaning. Some hold that a 
polysemous term has a thin lexical meaning which only contains information constraining the 
range of concepts the term can be used to express. See for example, Carston (2012). Others, that 
the term has a core meaning, a set of features shared by all senses. See for example, Jackendoff 
(1992). Still others, a lexical meaning rich in conceptual information, which interlocutors have to 
select only a portion appropriate to a given context. For example, see Pustejovsky (1995), 
Vicente (2018), Ortega-Andres and Vicente (2019), and Quilty-Dunn (2021).  
A third question, related to the first two, is whether the lexical meaning is a literal 
meaning available to speakers. If so, then modulation is optional: when an expression is used 
literally, a lexical meaning just is the contributed content. Availability is a mark of post-
propositional pragmatic processes. Understanding a modulated use does not require awareness of 
the expression’s literal meaning. To access the literal meaning, one must reflect on a variety of 
occasions of use so to isolate the core meaning, or identify the rich meaning. Ruhl (1989), for 
example, views the lexical meaning as underspecified along dimensions of concrete/abstract, 
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static/dynamic, and so on; the lexical meaning is encoded unconsciously and cannot be 
articulated by typical competent speakers.  
The proposal floated in this paper might be seen as a variant of these pragmatic 
approaches to polysemy. The proposal treats the multiple interpretability of ‘cause’ as a kind of 
context sensitivity, not as a kind of ambiguity. There are not distinct lexical meanings 
conventionally encoded, and retrieved separately on different occasions of use. And so the 
proposal does not incur the challenges faced by those who treat polysemy as ambiguity. We can 
retain a distincion between polysemy and homonymy; we do not require profligate lexical 
meanings for each polysemous term and so offer an arguably more parsimonious theory; and we 
can easily allow for novel usage.  
It would be an instructive exercise to compare an approach drawing on iterated questions 
under discussion with other pragmatic approaches to ‘cause’. Like some other approaches, the 
proposal resolves the multiple interpretability of ‘cause’ through a post-propositional pragmatic 
process. What is said is partly determined by what is being asked, at any given point of a 
discourse.  
The proposed lexical meaning of ‘cause’ bears similarities with some of these other 
pragmatic theories, as well. A dynamic semantics takes the meaning of an statement to be a 
function from the context of utterance to the updated context or, roughly equivalently, the answer 
to a question under discussion. Insofar as answers to subquestions, involving for example that 
which produces an effect or that on which an effect depends, partly answers the superquestion 
governing a causal discourse, we might think of the meaning of ‘cause’ on this proposal as akin 
to a core or rich lexical meaning. But the proposal does not rely on a literal meaning to ‘cause’, 
encoded as a lexical meaning, available to speakers or not, that is subsequently modulated 
through various tropes such as metonymy, narrowing, broadening or metaphor.  
All that seems right to me. The sense in which Billy’s actions in THE BOMBING or my not 
watering the plants in THE PLANTS are causes of what happens is not merely metaphorical. Nor 
does calling these events causes strike me as a metonym with production like calling both the 
institution and the building a school, a loosening like saying an ATM swallows a credit card, or a 
narrowing like restricting ‘drink’ to alcohol. However, it is not my intention to argue for these 
claims here. Rather, I am assuming the truth of causal pluralism, and I doubt that causal 
pluralists should view causal notions as related along these dimensions of modulation. For 
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example, if one held that there are two distinct legitimate causal notions, production and 
dependence, one would likely be disposed to reject treating talk of one notion as mere metaphor. 
Moreover, I do not aim to argue for the superiority of the proposal over other pragmatic 
theories. To argue for the proposal as a general theory of polysemy would take us far afield. I put 
the proposal forward as an example of an approach to causal discourse, available to the causal 
pluralist, that does not view ‘cause’ as ambiguous. The proposal is given in some detail, so to 
flesh out the example. But the proposal is a mere sketch. Finally, there is an ulterior motive in 
choosing an approach that employs stacked questions under discussion.  
To bring out this motivation, I will return to the concerns, raised in the introduction, over 
the philosophical interest of the paper. The metaphysical thesis that there are two kinds of 
causation can be disentangled from the linguistic claim that ‘cause’ is ambiguous. Can and 
should: causal ambiguity theory is vulnerable to the objections raised in §2. So the paper gives to 
determinate causal pluralists a defensive manuever. Of course, to note this is not to endorse the 
distinction between production and dependence. But the distinction also has given us a case 
study for the application of dynamic interpretation theory. The framework is flexible enough to 
model alternative ways of carving up causation. Let me mention two examples from earlier in the 
paper. First, we began with an origin story for causal pluralism. Aristotle’s views about causation 
are far removed from our own. But the affinities between the dynamic interpretation approach, 
and Aristotle’s association of the four causes with different answers to why-questions, should be 
clear. Although I have rejected Aristotle’s view that ‘cause’ is ambiguous, I have plumped for an 
approach that nonetheless could be loosely labelled ‘Aristotelian’. Our second example is 
Davidson’s causal ambiguity theory. Recall from our comments in §1, Davidson holds that 
‘cause’ is ambiguous between causation and causal explanation. The contrast might be better 
handled with a dynamic interpretation approach. Explanations are especially well thought of as 
answers to certain kinds of questions. But these issues lie outside our topic of causal pluralism, 
and I must leave discussion to another occasion.9 
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